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I.

INTRODUCTION

This paper argues that the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) legislation has a severe flaw deep within its architecture, one which is severely compromising patient privacy. In 1996, the
United States Congress enacted HIPAA. 1 HIPAA is divided into two titles,
*
Mr. Wafa earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in Engineering and the distinguished San Filippo Merit Scholarship from Santa Clara University. In 2003, he received
"Faculty Recognition for Technical Excellence" for his role on the project, "Multimedia
Data over Wireless Networks," at the prestigious Computer Society International Design
Competition (CSIDC). Mr. Wafa received his law degree from Loyola Law School (J.D.
2009), with an emphasis on Intellectual Property, Information Privacy, HIPAA, and Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX). He has provided enterprise information systems consultation services to
leading healthcare, legal and banking institutions. Mr. Wafa is a member of the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the Healthcare Information and Management
Systems Society (HIMSS), and the Center for Advanced Study and Research on Intellectual
Property (CASRIP).
I. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
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the first focusing on "Health Care Access, Portability, and Renewability, 2
the second on "Preventing Health Care Fraud and Abuse; Administrative
Simplification and Medical Liability Reform." 3 This paper will focus on the
"Administrative Simplification" of Title II. Under that section, the Secretary of Health and Human Services is required to "adopt national standards
for certain financial and administrative transactions, code sets, the security
of health information, and certain unique health identifiers" and "promulgate standards to protect the privacy of certain health information." 4 The
drafters of HIPAA were guided by a goal to improve "the effectiveness and
efficiency of the health care industry." 5 While the drafters were able to recognize the importance of providing comprehensive privacy legislation at
the federal level (to improve uniformity among states), they failed to recognize the importance granular requirements play in facilitating improved
privacy for patients throughout the country. This paper suggests that
HIPAA rules surrounding technology implementation give too much latitude to covered entities and therefore fail to provide adequate protection to
protected health information. Consequently, HIPAA rules should be rewritten to mandate baseline technical granular standards to ensure uniform efficacy in the safeguarding of protected health information.

II.

WHAT IS "GRANULARITY" AND How Is IT RELATED TO
PRIVACY?

Granularity is a term of art used in astronomy, photography, physics,
linguistics, and information technology. 6 The meaning of the word can vary
considerably depending on the context in which it is used. For purposes of
this paper, granularity will refer to the fineness of detail in the definition of
a technical standard. A truly granular requirement is one which provides
highly specific implementation instruction. A high degree of specificity is
achieved by mandating the use of specific technical protocols or standards
(as defined by industry groups such as the Institute for Electronic and Elec2.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L.
No.
104-191,
110
Stat.
1936
(1995),
available
at
https://www.cms.gov/HIPAAGenlnfo/Downloads/HIPAALaw.pdf.
3. Id.
4.
HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 71 Fed. Reg. 8390, 839091
(Feb.
16,
2006),
available
at
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/enforcementrule/enforcementfinalrule.
html.
5. Id.
6.
Health Insurance Reform: National Standard Employer Identifier, 63 Fed. Reg.
32,784-85
(June
16,
1998),
available
at
32,784,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/admnsimp/nprm/empnprm.txt.
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trical Engineers). 7 Conversely, a non-granular requirement is one that provides only general "guidance" on implementation goals and8 rebuffs efforts
to require providers to deploy specific technology solutions.
Granularity is relevant to the issue of privacy because it is an instrumental tool in facilitating the ability of providers to effectively secure data.
Without sufficient granularity, healthcare providers are left to assess solutions independently. Too often, this assessment occurs without adequate
resources or the expertise necessary to make an informed decision. Moreover, without sufficient granularity, providers are free to deploy solutions,
which may be cost-effective, but are outdated or unsound, thereby giving a
false impression that they have secured protected health information.
III.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIVACY-THE UNDERPINNINGS

In order to appreciate the value granular technology requirements
would bring to HIPAA, it is important to put patient privacy in the appropriate context. To frame the context appropriately, it will require that we
explore the confluence of social, legal, and political factors that have influenced our modem "right to privacy."
A.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY-SOCIAL UNDERPINNINGS

The word privacy has a tendency to evoke powerful images in one's
mind-images of confidential secrets that, if leaked, could devastate one's
livelihood. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines privacy as "freedom
from unauthorized intrusion." 9 But such a one-dimensional understanding
of the word fails to capture the essence of the meaning. At its core, privacy
is subjective and what one person may deem a deeply private matter may be
something another would freely share with the world. There is a widespread
consensus that the first publication advocating modem privacy was written
in 1890 by Samuel Warren and Justice Louis Brandeis. 10 In their Harvard
Law Review piece, Justice Brandeis wrote about "recent inventions and
business methods" in the late nineteenth century which required "the next
step be taken ...

for protection of the person, and for securing to the indi-

7.
Karl E. Wiegers, Writing Quality Requirements, SOFrWARE DEV., May 1999,
availableat http://www.processimpact.com/articles/qualreqs.html.

8.

Id.

9.
Merriam-Webster
Online
Dictionary,
Privacy,
http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/privacy (last visited May 2, 2010) (definition 1(b)).
10.
Ronald
B.
Standler,
Privacy Law
in
the
USA,
(1997),
http://www.rbs2.com/privacy.htm (stating that Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis
were the first to write about the right to privacy).
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vidual what Judge Cooley calls the 'right to be let alone.""' So while
Western thinkers have long asserted that "the enjoyment of financial and
personal privacy is fundamental to a free and civil society,"'' 2 Justice Brandeis was pointing out that privacy should be an evolving concept that needs
constant refinement in light of "new inventions and technology.""3 With the
advent of technology in the century that made the widespread dissemination
of private data exceedingly simple, Justice Brandeis's assertion was made
even more relevant. When individuals were asked in a recent poll whether
they believe there was a "right to privacy," overwhelmingly, ninety-six
percent responded in the affirmative.1 4 In fact, in a survey conducted by the
National Law Review, seventy-three percent of respondents believed that
the United States Constitution guarantees a right to privacy and fifty-one
percent thought that right was explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. 5
That being said, there is no question that a right to privacy, whether explicit
or implicit, is a cherished value that the majority of society holds dear.
B.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY-POLITICAL UNDERPINNINGS

Politicians, as representatives of the people, have had to create laws to
facilitate the privacy that citizens demand. Politicians have also had to exercise caution when drafting new laws to ensure that they do not directly or
indirectly transgress the right of the citizenry to be "let alone." The government has had an especially difficult job balancing citizen privacy whilst
ensuring that law enforcement has the tools necessary to do its job. This
balancing act was especially challenging after the attacks of September 11,
2001. Shortly after the attacks, the USA Patriot Act passed the United
States Senate virtually unanimously (with only one abstention and one nay
vote). 16 In a survey conducted soon after the USA Patriot Act was passed,
sixty-five percent of those polled felt their "right to privacy" had either
been lost or was under serious threat.' 7 Not surprisingly, when the Patriot
11.
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 195 (1890).
12.

Mark Skousen, The Right to be Left Alone, IDEAS ON LIBERTY, May 2002, at 4,

5, available at http://www.fee.org/pdf/the-freeman/skousen0502.pdf.
13.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11, at 195-96.
14.
FiredupAmerica, http://www.firedupamerica.com/node/244 (last visited May 2,
2010).
15.
Marcia Coyle, How Americans View the High Court: Poll Reveals Attitudes on
Right to Die, Abortion, and the Court Itself,NAT'L L.J., Feb. 26, 1990, at 1, 36-37.
16.
United States Patriot ACT Senate Roll Call Vote, 107th Cong. (Oct. 25, 2001),
http://www.senate.govlegislative/LIS/roll-call lists/roll-call vote cfm.cfm?congress=l07
&session=l &vote=00313.
17.
Shaheen Hasan, Americans Proud of U.S. and Constitution, but Want Children
Taught
the
Bad with
the
Good, PUB.
AGENDA,
Sept.
17.
2002,
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Act's provisions were set to sunset in 2005, many senators felt compelled
(probably "encouraged" by their concerned constituencies) to fight hard to
add more safeguards to protect civil liberties before reauthorizing the bill. 18
Clearly, politicians are sensitive to the demands of their constituency that
the right to privacy be respected.
C.

RIGHT TO PRIVACY-LEGAL UNDERPINNINGS

19

As mentioned above, most citizens are surprised to learn that privacy
is not one of the enumerated rights guaranteed in the Constitution. In fact,
the Constitution omits the word "privacy" entirely. 20 But courts in recent
history have acknowledged an unenumerated "right to privacy.",2' The
modern interpretation of this "unenumerated" right has its underpinnings
from the famous case of Griswold v. Connecticut.22 In Griswold, a statute
that outlawed contraceptives was voided as an infringement of the right to
marital privacy. The majority opinion, written by Justice Douglas held that
"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. 23 In
support of these guarantees, Justice Douglas stated the following:
Various guarantees create zones ofprivacy. The right of association contained in tie penumbra of the First Amendment is one ....The Third Amendment in its prohibition
against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in time of
peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. [Additionally,] [t]he Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in their

http://www.publicagenda.org/press-releases/americans-proud-us-and-constitution-wantchildren-taught-bad-good.
18.
Associated Press, Senate OKs Patriot Act Renewal, USA TODAY, March 2,
2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-03-02-patriot-act-x.htm.
19.
The author has also written a piece that examines, in great detail, the legal underpinnings of the right to privacy. See Tim Wafa, Citizen Privacy in a High-Tech Century
(May 7, 2010)
(working
paper,
on
file
with
author),
available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1602111.
20.
Doug Linder, The Right of Privacy, the Issue: Does the Constitution Protect the
Right of Privacy? If So, What Aspects of Privacy Receive Protection?, EXPLORING
CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFLICTS,

http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/rightofprivacy.html
(last visited
May 2, 2010).
21.
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
22.
381. U.S. 479.
Id.at 484.
23.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

and effects, against unreasonable
persons, houses, papers,
2' 4
searches and seizures.

9

Justice Douglas went on to say that "the enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people. ' 25 In other words, while privacy is not explicitly mentioned, it is
one of the values served and protected by the Amendments. While courts
have largely followed the Griswold line of reasoning on the right to privacy, not all legal scholars accept it. Chief Justice John Roberts, in a December 11, 1981 memo to his boss, then Attorney General William French
Smith, referred to a comment by former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold
that "derided the so-called right to privacy. '26 Roberts wrote in his memo
that "such an amorphous right is not to be found in the Constitution. ,,27
In addition to the case law establishing a constitutional right to privacy, numerous federal and state statutes require the government to protect
the privacy of its citizens. These statutes include (1) the Privacy Act of
1974,28 which prevents the unauthorized disclosure of personal information
held by the federal government; (2) the Fair Credit Reporting Act,29 which
protects information gathered by credit reporting agencies; (3) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,30 which mandates certain privacy standards for
the financial industry; and (4) California's Senate Bill 1386,31 which places
responsibility on companies operating in that state to inform customers
when their data has been exposed or compromised.
IV.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF HEALTHCARE INFORMATION PRIVACY

In light of the fast moving social, political, and legal evolution of the
right to privacy, regulations at both the state and federal level have been
struggling to keep up. In order to provide additional color to this issue, it is
worthwhile to explore recent healthcare-centric information privacy regulation at the state and federal level.
24.

25.
26.

Id.(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. III; U.S. CONST.amend. IV) (emphasis added).
Id.
James Rowley, U.S. Supreme Court Nominee's Memos Questioned Right to

Privacy,
BLOOMBERG
NEWS,
Aug.
2,
2005,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid = 10000103&sid=aOFlWcXDqDTU&refer=us.
27.
Id.
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2000).
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2000).
30. Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act of 2002, Pub. L.No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
31.
S.B. 1386, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (codified as amended at CAL. CIV.
CODE
§
1798.29
(West 2009)), available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01 02/bilVsen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386 bill 20020926 chaptered.html.
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STATE LAW

California has had a relatively long history of patient-centric information privacy regulations on its books. In 1977, the California legislature
passed the California Information Practices Act.32 The Act was one of the
first of its kind, requiring state government to protect the privacy of personal information maintained by the government.33 Additionally, California
health and safety codes incorporate a large number of privacy related regulations; these include sections 103525, 103525.5, 103526, 103526.5,
103527, and 103528.34 Most notable of the health and safety codes, as related to healthcare information privacy, are provisions that control patient
access to health records.3 5
More recently, in September 2008, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
signed two new bills into law, California SB541 and AB21 1.36 Both bills
provide "new oversight, stricter requirements, and increased penalties for
breaches of medical data confidentiality. ' '37 The laws-prompted by allegations that employees at the UCLA Medical Center had been snooping into
celebrity medical data, providers, and health plans-hold individuals accountable for unauthorized access to medical information, not just for unlawful use or disclosure.38 AB 211 requires
providers, health care service plans, and contractors to safeguard confidential medical information reasonably and
prevent unauthorized access. It also creates a new state office to oversee the enforcement of state laws on medical information privacy. The companion bill, SB 541, increases
fines for immediate jeopardy from the current maximum of
$25,000 (in the absence of departmental regulations) to
$100,000 and makes such fines applicable to clinics, health
facilities, home health agencies, and hospices. It also sets

CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798 (West 2009).
Id. § 1798.1.
34.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 103525, 103525.5, 103526, 103526.5,
103527, 103528 (West 2006).
35.
Seeid.§ 123110.
36.
Clark Stanton et al., New California Laws Strengthen Patient Privacy,
ADVISORIES
(Davis
Wright
Tremaine
LLP),
Oct.
3,
2008,
http://www.dwt.com/LeamingCenter/Advisories?find=29750.
37.
New California Laws Increase Penalties for Privacy Breaches of Confidential
Patient Data, LEGAL NEWS ALERT (Foley & Lardner LLP, Chi.), Oct. 2008, available at
http://www.foley.com/abc.aspx?Publication=5334
32.
33.

38.

Id.
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forth specific administrative penalties for privacy breaches.

39

California has had a breach notification law for many years that requires:
Any agency that owns or licenses computerized data that
includes personal information shall disclose any breach of
the security of the system following discovery or notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident
of California whose unencrypted personalinformation was,
or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. 40
SB 1386 defines "Personal Information" as the following:
[A]n individual's first name or first initial and last name in
combination with any one or more of the following data
elements, when either the name or the data elements are not
encrypted:
(1) Social security number.
(2) Driver's license number or California Identification Card number.
(3) Account number, credit or debit card number,
in combination with any required security code,
access code, or password that would permit access
to an individual's financial account.4 1
On January 1, 2008, the new California Privacy Breach Law went into effect. AB 1298 updated the definition of the term personal information to
39.

Id.; accord Assemb. 211, 2007-2008 Leg., 2007-2008 Sess., at 91 (Cal. 2008),

http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0201 0250/ab 211 bill 20080930_chaptered.pdf ("This bill would require every provider of

health care, as defined, to implement appropriate specified safeguards to protect the privacy
of a patient's medical information. The bill would require every provider of health care to
reasonably safeguard confidential medical information from unauthorized or unlawful
access, use, or disclosure.").
40.
S.B. 1386, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (codified as amended at CAL. CIv.
CODE
§
1798.29
(West 2009)),
available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/O102/bill/sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_bill_20020926_chaptered.html (emphasis added).
41.
Id. (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.29(e) (West 2009)), available
at
http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/01-02/bill/sen/sb_13511400/sb_1386_bill_20020926 chaptered.html.

2010]

HIPAA HAS COMPROMISED PATIENTPRIVACY

include two new categories of information: medical information and health
insurance information. The basic idea behind AB 1298 is succinctly stated
by the California Department of Health Services website:
[W]hen a person's name plus medical information or health
insurance information in unencrypted computerized form
are acquired, or believed to be acquired, by an unauthorized person, the law requires individual notification of the
breach, regardless of whether social security numbers are
involved. By adding medical and health insurance data to
the law, the State Breach Notification law is amended from
a financial identity theft law to a far broader law triggering
breach notifications whenever medical or health insurance
policy information are breached. The intent is to prevent
the growing crime of medical identity theft and to protect
confidential medical information by encouraging encryption.42
California is not the only state aggressively pursuing regulation of data
privacy. Nevada recently enacted Senate Bill 227, which is the first state
law in the country "to impose a general requirement on all businesses and
government agencies to encrypt sensitive data transmitted or carried outside
of the premises of the business or agency." 43 Michigan has legislation pending, Senate Bill 1022, which would go even further than the Nevada bill, by
requiring businesses to encrypt stored consumer data.an The relevant part of
the proposed Michigan statute is as follows: "If the person collects personal
identifying information in the regular course of business and stores that
information in a computerized database, failing or neglecting to store that
information in the database in an encrypted form, in conformity with current industry-standard encryption methods and capabilities." 5 It is particularly interesting that Michigan has taken the lead in data-privacy protection
38.
California Department of Health Care Services, Privacy Bills Signed into Law,
http://www.dhcs.ca.gov/formsandpubs/laws/priv/Pages/PrivacyLegislation.aspx (last visited
May 2, 2010).
43.
Jim Halpert, Amended Nevada Law Mandates Encryption, Compliance with PCI
Data Security Standard, NEWS & INSIGHTS (DLA Piper), Oct. 13, 2009,
http://www.diapiper.com/amended-nevada-law-mandates-encryption-compliance-with-pcidata-security-standard/; accord NEV. REV. STAT. § 603A (2009) (effective 2010); S.B. 227,
75th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Nev. 2009), 2009 Nev. Stat. 1603, 1604 (noting the new statute
"becomes effective on January 1, 2010").
44.
S.B. 1022, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); see also Randy Gainer, Some
State Data Encryption Requirements More Effective than Others, PRIVACY & SECURITY L.
LLP),
Feb.
27,
2008,
BLOG
(Davis
Wright
Tremaine
http://www.privsecblog.com/archives/1 22012-print.html.
S.B. 1022, 94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008)
45.
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by recognizing that it's not only important to encrypt data, but also important that the data be competently encrypted with current standards.46
B.

FEDERAL LAW

On the federal front, Congressman Pete Stark recently introduced H.R.
6898, the Health-e Information Technology Act of 2008. 4 7 "The bill establishes a permanent governance structure to develop health information
technology (HIT) standards, encourages adoption of HIT through grants
and payment incentives to providers, and alters HIPAA privacy standards. ' '48 While the main thrust of the bill is centered on incentives to encourage healthcare providers to adopt electronic medical record systems, it
also aims to "[r]ecommend standards and guidance ... to ensure interoperability, security/privacy, and clinical utility of electronic health information. ''49 Unfortunately, the legislation suffers from the same sort of problem
that HIPAA faces-insubstantial standards-H.R. 6898 "standards would
not be binding on private entities"50 and would be strictly voluntary.
Technologists when presented with "voluntary" (e.g., H.R. 6898) or
"insubstantial" (e.g., HIPAA) standards, chuckle. Techdictionary.com defines a standard as "[a]n agreed-upon set of specifications for hardware or
software. [These specifications make] it possible for different manufacturers to create products that are compatible with each other." 51 Andrew Tanenbaum, a well-renowned computer scientist, poked fun at the notion of
insubstantial or voluntary standards, noting that "[t]he nice thing about
standards is that there are so many of them to choose from., 52 Tanenbaum
was making reference to "the fact that competing standards become a
source of confusion, division, obsolescence, and duplication of effort instead of an enhancement to the usefulness of products. 53 Thus, with this
regulatory context in mind, a context which unabashedly advocates for vo46.

with

47.
48.

Id.

Health-c Information Technology Act, H.R. 6898, 110th Cong. (2008).
Premier, ChairmanStark Introduces Health Information Technology Legislation
Privacy

Provisions,

http://www.premierinc.com/about/advocacy/issues/06/hit/Chairman-Stark091608.jsp
(last
visited May 2, 2010).
49.
MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 110TH CONG., SECTION BY
SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE HEALTH-E INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT OF 2008, at I (Comm.
Print
2008),
available
at
http://www.stark.house.gov/images/stories/I 10/legislation/200809hit/analysis.pdf.
50.
Id. at2.
51.
TechDictionary.com,
The
Online
Computer
Dictionary,
http://www.techdictionary.com (search "search by term" for "standard") (last visited May 2,
2010).
52.

53.

ANDREW S. TANENBAUM, COMPUTER NETWORKS 235 (4th ed. 2003).

Id.
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luntary standards and unabashedly prefers decentralized (local) decision
making over mandated (centralized) protocol/solution decision making, we
can take a closer look at the "weakest link" in HIPAA legislation and subsequently address the ethical and legal ramifications.
V.

THE ILLUSORY "STANDARD"-THE WEAKEST LINK IN HIPAA
LEGISLATION

Securing protected health information has been exceedingly challenging. Part of the problem in achieving the protections desired is the slow
adoption rate of technological innovation by American healthcare providers. In 2006, a Commonwealth Fund survey of six thousand primary care
physicians across the developed world found, "while virtually all [primary
care physicians] in the Netherlands, New Zealand and the U.K. have and
use electronic medical records, just [twenty-eight] percent of U.S. physicians routinely use [electronic medical records]. 54
The slow adoption of electronic medical records by U.S. based healthcare providers and, more broadly, the technology adoption lag, is arguably
the result of an overabundance of technology standards in a regulatory environment which explicitly encourages standard competition. Because data
can be secured via a variety of methods and HIPAA covered entities are
free to choose the solution "that "meets their needs," providers often find
themselves overwhelmed by options at their disposal. While this "flexible"
strategy is defended by HIPAA drafters as necessary to ensure covered entities are not overburdened, the strategy has resulted in both a confusing and
exploitable environment.
HIPAA unambiguously lays out its objective (with respect to the final
rule surrounding security), its methodology for achieving that objective,
and justification for following such a methodology:
The purpose of this final rule is to adopt national standards
for safeguards to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of electronic protected health information....

This final rule adopts standards as required under title
II, subtitle F, sections 261 through 264 of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. 104-191. These standards require measures to be
taken to secure this information while in the custody of ent54.
FierceHealthcare, Study: US Providers Lag in Evening Care, IT Use (2006),
http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/node/4174.
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ities covered by HIPAA (covered entities) as well as in
transit between covered entities and from covered entities
to others.55
The methodology to secure the data is
based on three basic concepts that were derived from the
Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA. First,
the standard should be comprehensive and coordinated to
address all aspects of security. Second, it should be scalable, so that it can be effectively implemented by covered
entities of all types and sizes. Third, it should not be linked
to specific technologies, allowing covered entities to make
use of future technology advancements. 56
The following is an example of an "addressable" standard as defined by the
final rule: "Encryption (Addressable). Implement a mechanism to encrypt
electronic protected health information whenever deemed appropriate. 5 7
Note the absence of specific instructions (i.e., granularity) as to the encryption methodology or mechanism-it is simply left as "addressable."
The drafters were opposed to linking any of their standards to specific
technologies. Unfortunately, a standard as implied by the HIPAA rules
(flexible, addressable, and open-ended) stands in direct contradiction to the
notion of a true "standard" by one computer scientist. 58 The drafters in their
definition have nurtured a confusing, divisive, duplicative, and obscenest
environment-it is no wonder American healthcare providers are so slow to
deploy technology to the field. Interestingly enough, the lack of true (granular) security standards was not an accident or careless oversight, it was a
point of contention amongst the HIPAA drafters that had to be worked
through. In the drafters comments, they noted that:
[t]he comment process overwhelmingly validated
[their] basic assumptions that the entities affected by this
regulation are so varied in terms of installed technology,
size, resources, and relative risk, that it would be impossi-

164).

55.

68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162, and

56. Id. at 8335 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 8379.
58. See TechDictionary.com, supra note 51 (defining "standard" as "[a]n agreedupon set of specifications for hardware or software. Agreeing upon standards makes it possible for different manufacturers to create products that are compatible with each other. Standards may be set by official standards organizations, or they may be unofficial standards that
are established by common use.").
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ble to dictate a specific solution or set of solutions that
would be useable by all covered entities. Many commenters also supported the concept of technological neutrality,
which would afford them the flexibility to select appropriate technology solutions and to adopt new technology over
time.5 9
Moreover, the drafters noted that they:
received numerous comments expressing the view that the
security standards should not be overly prescriptive because the speed with which technology is evolving could
make specific requirements obsolete and might in fact deter
technological progress. We [the drafters] have accordingly
written the final rule to frame the standards in terms that
are as generic as possible and which, generally speaking,
may be met through various approaches or technologies. 60
In other words, the drafters of HIPAA justified their decision to opt for
broad guidelines over prescriptive granular requirements because (1) they
did not think granular standards would be a viable solution for all covered
entities, and (2) they believed granular standards would deter technological
progress.
The first justification is false on its face--overly prescriptive granular
requirements (standards) are not only a viable solution, but also they are
exactly what the industry needs. In fact, HIPAA already mandates very
specific (granular) technical requirements when it comes to transmission of
health claims. Any burden placed on providers to implement such solutions
is necessary to achieve the ultimate aim of a uniformly safe environment. In
fact, when HIPAA rules first laid out the granular technical requirements
for Electronic Data Interchange (EDI), the technology used to exchange
healthcare claims data between providers and payors, there was uproar that
it was overly prescriptive, complicated, and burdensome. 6' But as time
wore on, and end-users began to recognize the long-term benefit that a truly
uniform and thus scalable environment provides, by decreasing cost, improving reliability, and increasing predictability, the resistance faded
away.62 Moreover, the argument that smaller providers cannot be expected
59.
68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8335 (Feb. 20, 2003) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 162,
and 164) (emphasis added).
60.
Id. at 8336.
61.
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2000, http://www.govtech.com/gt/94608.
62.
Alan Kotok, EDI, Take It and Leave It, O'Reilly XML.com, Aug. 4, 1999,
http://www.xmi.com/pub/a/1999/08/edi/index4.html.
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to use a particular type of encryption because it is "burdensome" is nonsensical. In very rare instances would reliance on a specific type of technology
(e.g., Encryption X vs. Encryption Y) be so much costlier and complicated
to implement that it would be a huge burden on covered entities. To receive
the benefits of a uniform privacy protection environment requires all covered entities to be held to the same granular standard. This is a trade-off that
is implicit in the very definition of a standard, something that the agency
and covered entities need to acknowledge.
The second justification is also a non-issue. The drafters were correct
insomuch as they acknowledged that technology standards evolve. Obviously we cannot expect HIPAA to rely on static standards perpetually.
That being said, HIPAA should put in place a standards committee to review various standards and solutions and publish updated technical mandates on acceptable and unacceptable solutions on a regular basis. This will
allow the agency-rather than individual providers-to balance the costs
and benefits of specific solutions with respect to privacy solutions.
To illustrate how confusing and exploitable an addressable strategy
like that of HIPAA can be, one need only walk through a typical scenario in
the IT offices of any small or medium sized healthcare provider. Here is
one such example constructed from this author's real-world experience:
Qaizer Healthcare Incorporated is in the process of deploying a wireless network to facilitate the ability of its clinicians to access their information system "on the go." As
part of this deployment, Qaizer must comply with the
HIPAA addressable "encryption standard." That standard,
as noted above requires that Qaizer "implement a mechanism to encrypt electronic protected health information
whenever deemed appropriate."
The first issue a technician would encounter when posed with the task
of safeguarding the electronic data is determining which technology solution to use and in what context to use it. Protection mechanisms span the
whole lifecycle of electronic data, including, but not limited to, the following: (1) file level and share level protection (locking down files and networks so that only certain users can access data), (2) password-protecting
documents and applications (password protecting files via non-encrypted
technology), (3) operating system and disk-level encryption (encrypting
data in its most basic form (bytes & bits)), (4) making use of public key
infrastructure (a convenient way to share encrypted data with trusted thirdparties), (5) relying on network level (IP security) to encrypt data that is
being transmitted (wired or wirelessly) to other remote computer systems,
and (6) using rights management solutions to control rights to a particular
piece of data (e.g., video or music) after it has been disseminated to other
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computer systems. 63 Each of the six mechanisms described above has a

subset of dozens (if not hundreds) of competing standards. In the Qaizer
example, the technician will focus on encrypting the wirelessly transmitted
data because it would be appropriate to encrypt data floating freely over the
airwaves. Because HIPAA requirements are silent about how data must be
encrypted (i.e., addressable), the technician has wide latitude to deploy
whatever encryption solution he or she feels justified to use. 64 Encryption is
the act of turning a block of plain text or other raw data into encoded blocks
of text that only authorized personnel can read.65 Such encryption can be
facilitated via a plethora of different technology solutions. Individuals who
buy a laptop and want to connect to a wireless network can attest to this
fact. Wireless data can be encrypted via the Wireless Encryption Protocol
(WEP), the Wifi Protected Access Standard (WPA), the Wifi Protected
Access 2 Standard (WPA2), or a variety of other standards.6 6 Within each
of these standards, sub-standards exist. WEP networks may be secured via
40-bit, 64-bit, 128-bit or 256-bit key.67 WPA networks may or may not rely
on the Temporal Key Integrity Protocol (TKIP) or the Pre-Shared Key
(PSK) to provide varying degrees of encryption protection.6 8 There is no
need for purposes of this paper to go into great detail about each of the substandards; however, it is important to note that the goal of the above standards is one in the same, namely, to secure wirelessly transmitted data. But,
each of these protocols attempts to achieve the goal using its own proprietary methodology, and as such, each protocol has a different cost-benefit
profile. For example, while the WEP protocol is easy to implement because
it is available right out of the box in most wireless network hardware, it has
been deemed easily exploitable by hackers.69 WPA, while more secure than

63.
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WEP, has been known to degrade network throughput. 70 Network technicians, when given the latitude to deploy the encryption technology of their
choice are, for all practical purposes, being allowed to independently
choose the "best" privacy solution. While HIPAA drafters argue that flexibility is a necessity, which allows covered entities to secure data in light of
real world constraints such as resources, time, and manpower, the reality is
that the freedom to implement solutions subjectively is a potential point of
failure in the architecture of HIPAA.71 Under existing HIPAA guidelines,
the Qaizer technician could legitimately opt to deploy WEP, which is the
easiest and most cost-effective encryption solution, even though he is aware
that the solution is prone to failure and quite inferior to other solutions out
in the market. 72 The technician would be tasked with justifying his/her selection in a subjective manner with no oversight on the methodology used
to come to the decision. 73 Thus, justification is little more than a rubberstamp which does little to ensure the privacy of patient data. Also, technicians having highly specific knowledge about technical standards/protocols
can influence superiors who question their decision about the use of particular solutions. Voluntary standards, such as those offered by House Report 6898, 74 may be helpful to compliance officers who are trying to ensure
that their staff is doing a competent job safeguarding data. But because the
House Report 689871 standards are voluntary and because of the disparity of
knowledge between IT professionals and their superiors, such standards are
often dismissed by technicians as overkill and most compliance officers
would6 trust the judgment of their IT department without being too aggres7
sive.
Another reason HIPAA should resist encouraging covered entities to
independently select technology solutions is the wide disparity of financial
resources, manpower, and expertise amongst providers in the healthcare
industry. Ironically, HIPAA drafters cite the disparity amongst healthcare
providers as a justification for allowing providers the flexibility to choose
their own solutions.7 7 HIPAA drafters were influenced by feedback that
they received that providers "know their own situation best" and therefore
70.
Roger Gann, Wi-Fi Networking, Lo-Fi Security? Steps Towards the Secure
Wireless LAN, TECHWORLD, Oct. 3, 2003, http://features.techworld.com/mobilewireless/160/wi-fi-networking-lo-fi-security/ (last visited May 2, 2010).
71.
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should be given the "flexibility" to do what they want.7 8 The disparity between providers results in several problems. First, without mandating granular requirements, smaller healthcare organizations are left to fend for
themselves, without adequate resources, manpower, and expertise to select
and deploy systems. This can lead to poor decision making and improper
analysis of what solution provides the best protection for patient privacy.
Second, providers have no real incentive to choose the best privacy solution; smaller providers, who have limited resources, would do just as well
to select and deploy the cheapest or the easiest to implement, even if that
solution is outdated or easily exploitable. Third, smaller providers can mislead the public by insinuating that they have effectively safeguarded patient
data by being HIPAA compliant, even though they have deployed secondrate solutions. HIPAA compliancy, because of its flexible technology selection rules does not necessarily imply that best practices for safeguarding of
data are being followed (e.g., Wireless Encryption Protocol under HIPAA
would be perfectly acceptable even though it is easily exploitable by hackers).
VI.

-

ETHICAL CHALLENGES

The ethical repercussions stemming from HIPAA's reliance on broad
guidelines in lieu of specific implementation detail are numerous. By allowing covered entities to self-regulate the technology solution selection
process, loopholes have been created which undermine justice and beneficence.
There are a variety of perspectives commonly used to ascertain whether or not an action is ethical. These include (1) consequentialism, whether
an act is morally right depends only on the consequences of that act or of
something related to that act, such as the motive behind the act; 79 (2) deontology, whether an act is moral depends on what our moral duties are and
what correct rules exist to regulate those duties (i.e., when we follow our
duty, we are behaving morally); 80 (3) natural law theory, whether an act is
moral depends on the body of moral principles common to all humankind
and is recognizable by human reason alone; 81 and (4) virtue theory, a vir78.
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tuous person is a morally good, excellent, or admirable person who acts and
feels well, rightly, as she should. 82 The public is being misled to believe
that HIPAA mandates strong security and privacy standards, when in reality
HTPAA creates a relatively weak framework that allows companies to implement whatever standards or technology solutions they subjectively feel
is justified. Under any of the ethical perspectives, it would be deemed unethical for society, or individuals, to be deceived into a false sense of security because (1) the consequences of the implied deception are harmful
(e.g., a privacy breach stemming from the deployment of second-rate technology solutions could lead to a breach); (2) institutions and the government owe a duty to be transparent and straight-forward about privacy protections to patients, and average citizens cannot be expected to know that
the details of framework are so convoluted as to allow covered entities carte
blanche on choosing their own technology standards; (3) deception and
misguidance of the public is morally objectionable and recognizable as such
by human reason; and (4) deceit is not a virtue and should be avoided. The
drafters may argue that their intent was to strike a delicate balance between
ensuring the privacy of patient data whilst minimizing the burden on covered entities. But they made a tremendous error in judgment when they
assumed that mandating specific, granular, technology solutions would be
too much of a burden on covered entities and would limit technological
innovation. Because of the drafters' decision not to mandate specific, granular, technology solutions,8 3 the healthcare information technology space
has become inefficient and inconsistent which has, in turn, compromised
patient privacy.
Using a principalism-based approach to ethical decision making, the
same conclusion is reached. In a principalist-based approach "four principles, or values, become a common starting point for everyone interested
in 'bioethics' and a 'coherent package' of relevant considerations for addressing the issues that may arise as part of the field of biomedical ethics,
without the need of resorting to or arguing about competing 'theories' of
ethics. ' 84 The four principles are (1) autonomy, which is acknowledging
decision-making rights and enabling persons to act autonomously; 85 (2)
nonmaleficence, which means that we can and should protect persons
against some types and levels of harm, as well as avoid causing harm to
82.
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83.
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them; 86 (3) beneficence, which establishes an obligation to help others further their important and legitimate interests; 87 and (4) justice, which is an
injustice involving a wrongful act or omission that denies people benefits to
which they have a right or distributes burdens unfairly. 8 In order to give
the public autonomy and respect their decision-making rights, the government must rectify the deception noted above. The government-by mandating granular, certified, technical requirements in HIPAA-should protect
patients from the harm of privacy breaches. Such a step would be beneficent because it would further the cause of privacy which we already established as a legitimate interest that society wants protected. 89 It would also
ensure justice by ensuring that consumers are not deceived into thinking
their data is being protected uniformly, from provider to provider, by an
effective HIPAA framework.
The government is the most efficient and appropriate body to promulgate granular requirements and not be deterred by pressure from entities
who want to mitigate the burdens of technical mandates. That being said,
the government should create a working group to review and certify technology solutions, which would meet the security and privacy criteria in the
spirit of the intent of HIPAA legislation-to competently protect the privacy of patient data and to ensure covered entities are not exploiting loopholes
as to be lazy on their duty to protect privacy.
Providers, by being allowed to self-regulate, have created an illusory
regulatory environment. The financial meltdown is the most recent example
of how dangerous self-regulation can be if left unchecked. By providing too
much latitude to providers, HIPAA fails to provide uniform privacy protection to patients-the very purpose behind the legislation.

VII.

LEGAL CHALLENGES

While the above section has established that the existing standards in
the context of the existing regulatory environment are unethical, there still
remains the question of whether legal reasons or principles exist that would
compel legislators and/or regulators to change the requirements and whether attempts to strengthen the requirements could be attacked as overbearing.
There have been a number of constitutional challenges to the Administrative Simplification provisions of HIPAA. 90 In 2001, the South Carolina
86.
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Medical Association filed a lawsuit against the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) alleging that the Administrative Simplification provisions:
exceed the limitations set within HIPAA regarding the type
of information to be regulated, i.e., the final Privacy Rule
covers not only electronic transmissions of protected health
information but also paper transmissions and oral communications. Plaintiffs allege that by applying the regulations
to all communications, HHS exceeded its express Congressional authority, which addressed only electronic transfers
of health information, and, therefore, the regulations "are
arbitrary and capricious in nature." 91
In August 2002, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the ruling
against the physician's finding that "Congress had acted appropriately in
delegating legislative power to the Department of Health and Human Services to draft and enforce the HIPAA regulations" and explicitly noting
"that Congress had 'laid out an intelligible principle to guide agency action.
Another "lawsuit was brought on August 30, 2001, in the United
States District Court in Houston, Texas, by the Association of American
Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. (AAPA), three patients, and Congressman
Ron Paul (R-TX) in his capacity as a Texas physician., 93 "The complaint
contains one count that mirrors a claim in the South Carolina lawsuit that
regulation of medical records, other than electronic transfers of health information, exceeds the scope of HIPAA." 94 The complaint also alleged that
"HIPAA's requirement that the government have access to personal medical records without a warrant or patient consent violates the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. 95
The plaintiffs also attacked the Privacy Rule's facilitation of the government's creation of a centralized database of personal medical records with
unique individual identifiers. 96 The plaintiffs argued that the initiative violates the Fourth Amendment. 97 Moreover, the complaint asserts that governmental access to patient-physician communications would have a chill91.
92.
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ing effect on such communications, in violation of the First Amendment's
free speech protections.98 The plaintiffs also claimed the privacy of medical
records has traditionally been regulated by the states and that Congress
failed to show an adverse effect upon interstate commerce sufficient to justify federal regulation that contravenes the Tenth Amendment.99 Finally, the
complaint alleged that HHS violated the Paperwork Reduction Act and the
Regulatory Flexibility Act by adopting regulations that impose immense
burdens on physicians without first having made
0 0 and disclosed realistic cost
alternatives.1
considered
having
or
assessments
Because the lawsuit was filed before HIPAA legislation took effect,
the United States District Court in Houston dismissed the suit for lack of
ripeness. 0 1 The court noted, "plaintiffs have not yet suffered any injury
from enforcement of the regulations."' 2 Although the AAPA stated0 that
it
3
would re-file when sufficiently ripe, no appeal has been filed to date.'
Courts have thus far viewed HIPAA legislation in a light most favorable to maximum government flexibility.1°4 In the South Carolina case, the
court went as far as to say, "that although Congress did not specify privacy
rights and policies in the privacy section of the statute, general congressional intent could be gleaned from the statutory framework as a whole, that
HHS was within its discretion to draft a very broad rule. 10 5 Moreover, legislative intent regarding the issue of what level of detail should be mandated
was specifically addressed by the HIPAA drafters.' 0 6 It is therefore highly
unlikely that a court would be willing to entertain arguments that the rule is
flawed because it is overly broad or overly narrow or that it exceeds the
scope of powers bestowed by Congress to the agencies. 10
While successful legal challenges to the specific intent of HIPAA legislators is unlikely, all hope is not lost. A major uproar by privacy advocates has emerged over the lack of enforcement action by regulators over
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was put in place to give people some confidence that when
they talk to their doctor or file a claim with their insurance
company, that information isn't going to be used against
them... [government agencies] have done almost nothing
to enforce the law or make sure people are taking it seriously. I think we're dangerously close to having a law
that is essentially meaningless.' 0 9
The issue of under prescriptive technical requirements could easily be attached to the existing grassroots movement by privacy advocates to seek
tougher HIPAA enforcement. In light of the broad acceptance of standards
that exist today, it is no wonder that regulators find themselves without too
much ammunition to aggressively pursue enforcement action.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

While the issue of technical granularity in HIPAA may not seem particularly sexy, it is one of the most under-represented lynchpins of success/failure in the legislation. In almost every respect underlying the purpose of HIPAA-be it the attempt to streamline efficiency, reduce costs,
provide the public with the privacy protections that they deserve/demand,
or to provide transparency and predictability-prescriptive granularity is
the most logical and effective choice. An unwillingness to address the absence of granularity is not only unethical, but it undermines the spirit of
HIPAA and the right to privacy.
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